TAIPEI - Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou's mention of a possible peace agreement with mainland China to end six decades of hostility across the Taiwan Strait has become a political bombshell.
Though Ma qualified his statement, saying this would only happen in 10 years and only after a referendum, Ma's unexpected move has the opposition anti-unification Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) up in arms. His domestic opponents allege Beijing wouldn't honor the pact and that it would weaken Taipei's status on the
strait, while the United States has hinted that such a deal could end its arms sales to the island.
Since 1949, when the Kuomintang fled the mainland to occupy Taiwan after losing a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People's Republic of China (PRC) founded by the CCP and the and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan have each claimed to be sole representative of the whole of China.
Despite the immensely lucrative cross-strait economic ties built over the past couple of decades, no progress has been made whatsoever on formally ending the state of hostilities between the two sides.
This is why, though mainland China has become the island's by far biggest trade partner, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) isn't showing any sign of slowing its arms build-up vis-a-vis the island. It also explains the absence of even the most basic mutual military confidence-building measures (CBM) in place, such as a military hotline, early warning measures, pre-notification of key military exercises or the signing of codes of conduct for activities of fighter jets and naval fleets.
But changing this for the better is not easy for the Taiwanese side to initiate. Whereas elsewhere peace deals are signed after long and painful efforts in crafting mutual concessions, it's a different matter with the Taiwan Strait .
Beijing insists on what it has always demanded, namely that Taiwan is part of the PRC regardless how the Taiwanese see themselves and their democratically elected leaders, whom Beijing does not officially recognize. Beijing says the ROC no longer exists, and any attempt by Taipei to formally separate Taiwan from China by steering toward a state-to-state relationship or delay unification until the twelfth of never would bring about war.
It also says China will never renounce "its right" to use force as long as Taipei doesn't recognize the one-China principle.
Hence, the precondition for the two sides starting talks on ending hostility is that both sides must agree there is one China in the world. This requires both sides to engage in political talks on what exactly is this one China.
Because of this Ma's domestic opponents see his talk of a peace agreement appearing on the horizon as a sign he will agree to something that cements Taiwan's subordinate status, rewarding the Chinese leadership for decades of brutal stubbornness. Particularly as he didn't call for Beijing to considerably soften its granite-like stance in his speech.
"The Taiwanese people did not give President Ma the right and authority to initiate talks that would begin political negotiations across the Taiwan Strait and eventual unification," protested DPP spokesperson Chen Chi-mai.
"How can you safeguard our sovereignty if the relationship under the pact is not defined as a state-to-state relationship?" said DPP legislator Lee Chun-yee.
"China once signed a peace agreement with Tibet, which only led Beijing to stage an invasion afterwards," added former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui said.
Others charged that a peace agreement with China would grossly undermine Taiwan's strategic posture. This notion is fueled by a diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks in which US officials assessed that cross-Strait negotiations on such issues could end US arms sales to Taiwan.
In an interview with Asia Times Online, Bonnie S Glaser, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, rejected the idea that a peace accord and CBMs should be regarded as pegged - an approach favored by Ma and Taiwanese military officers. She argues that Taiwan should go ahead with forging military CBMs despite the absence of a peace accord.
"Taiwan's security challenge is unique in many ways. It is therefore necessary for Taiwan to use a set of strategies to enhance its security, and CBMs having a value on their own as something that reduces the risk of conflict resulting from miscalculation or accident should be an important part of it," Glaser said.
Ever since Ma made his proposal, observers of Taiwanese domestic politics have been scratching their heads, wondering why Ma brought up such an explosive topic relatively shortly before legislative and presidential elections to be held early next year. Hi call for a referendum also contrasts with the fact that referenda are an anathema to the CCP.
According to some critics, Ma's move was aimed at forcing his DPP opponent Tsai Ing-wen to reveal her stance on the issue of cross-strait relations - long regarded a major weakness - while at the same time marginalizing People First Party chairman James Soong, whose potential candidacy could split the KMT's voter base. Others believe Ma simply made a mistake.
"While Ma wants to make China believe that he is serious about political negotiation in the future, he [wrongly] counts on that the mass public does not like Tsai Ing-wen so that it doesn't hurt to propose such kind of agreement," said Tsai Chia-hung, professor at the Election Study Center of Taipei's National Chengchi University.
Tsai acknowledged that many Taiwanese wouldn't class a peace agreement with China as an overly stupid idea, but in his eyes, Ma will fall victim to this apparent miscalculation.
"Certainly, Taiwanese show some support for the agreement, given that it seems harmless. But the DPP will mobilize people, and Ma may be underestimating the DPP."
To other experts, when Ma said his administration is cautiously considering whether Taiwan should sign a cross-strait peace agreement within the next decade, he basically said - nothing.
"Since Ma will not be president of the ROC a decade from now, he is not making any commitment at all," Steve Tsang, director of the University of Nottingham's China Policy Institute, pointed out.
Tsang says Ma was likely just reassuring Beijing of the goodwill from Taipei, and agrees that the 10-year timeline makes Ma's proposal somewhat meaningless.
"Let's not forget that 10 years from now the CCP leadership will be in another run up to another generational succession. That won't be the time when one can expect the CCP top leaders to take bold initiatives. Also, the assumption that China's development in the next decade will be on a linear project is generally unreliable."
Tsang then looked at what basis a peace agreement could possibly be on if it would come about nonetheless.
Despite the fears harbored by Taiwan's political opposition that Ma's KMT would eventually break its promise of making negotiations with China on the issue subject to sound legislative monitoring and a referendum, Tsang says a pact if seen as detrimental to Taiwan's situation is still unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate in Taiwan.
"It is hard to see any such agreement being politically acceptable in Taiwan if it should gravely undermine Taiwan's existing reality as an independent political entity or seriously put at risk Taiwan's capacity to defend itself," he said.
Though Ma qualified his statement, saying this would only happen in 10 years and only after a referendum, Ma's unexpected move has the opposition anti-unification Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) up in arms. His domestic opponents allege Beijing wouldn't honor the pact and that it would weaken Taipei's status on the
strait, while the United States has hinted that such a deal could end its arms sales to the island.
Since 1949, when the Kuomintang fled the mainland to occupy Taiwan after losing a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People's Republic of China (PRC) founded by the CCP and the and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan have each claimed to be sole representative of the whole of China.
Despite the immensely lucrative cross-strait economic ties built over the past couple of decades, no progress has been made whatsoever on formally ending the state of hostilities between the two sides.
This is why, though mainland China has become the island's by far biggest trade partner, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) isn't showing any sign of slowing its arms build-up vis-a-vis the island. It also explains the absence of even the most basic mutual military confidence-building measures (CBM) in place, such as a military hotline, early warning measures, pre-notification of key military exercises or the signing of codes of conduct for activities of fighter jets and naval fleets.
But changing this for the better is not easy for the Taiwanese side to initiate. Whereas elsewhere peace deals are signed after long and painful efforts in crafting mutual concessions, it's a different matter with the Taiwan Strait .
Beijing insists on what it has always demanded, namely that Taiwan is part of the PRC regardless how the Taiwanese see themselves and their democratically elected leaders, whom Beijing does not officially recognize. Beijing says the ROC no longer exists, and any attempt by Taipei to formally separate Taiwan from China by steering toward a state-to-state relationship or delay unification until the twelfth of never would bring about war.
It also says China will never renounce "its right" to use force as long as Taipei doesn't recognize the one-China principle.
Hence, the precondition for the two sides starting talks on ending hostility is that both sides must agree there is one China in the world. This requires both sides to engage in political talks on what exactly is this one China.
Because of this Ma's domestic opponents see his talk of a peace agreement appearing on the horizon as a sign he will agree to something that cements Taiwan's subordinate status, rewarding the Chinese leadership for decades of brutal stubbornness. Particularly as he didn't call for Beijing to considerably soften its granite-like stance in his speech.
"The Taiwanese people did not give President Ma the right and authority to initiate talks that would begin political negotiations across the Taiwan Strait and eventual unification," protested DPP spokesperson Chen Chi-mai.
"How can you safeguard our sovereignty if the relationship under the pact is not defined as a state-to-state relationship?" said DPP legislator Lee Chun-yee.
"China once signed a peace agreement with Tibet, which only led Beijing to stage an invasion afterwards," added former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui said.
Others charged that a peace agreement with China would grossly undermine Taiwan's strategic posture. This notion is fueled by a diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks in which US officials assessed that cross-Strait negotiations on such issues could end US arms sales to Taiwan.
In an interview with Asia Times Online, Bonnie S Glaser, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, rejected the idea that a peace accord and CBMs should be regarded as pegged - an approach favored by Ma and Taiwanese military officers. She argues that Taiwan should go ahead with forging military CBMs despite the absence of a peace accord.
"Taiwan's security challenge is unique in many ways. It is therefore necessary for Taiwan to use a set of strategies to enhance its security, and CBMs having a value on their own as something that reduces the risk of conflict resulting from miscalculation or accident should be an important part of it," Glaser said.
Ever since Ma made his proposal, observers of Taiwanese domestic politics have been scratching their heads, wondering why Ma brought up such an explosive topic relatively shortly before legislative and presidential elections to be held early next year. Hi call for a referendum also contrasts with the fact that referenda are an anathema to the CCP.
According to some critics, Ma's move was aimed at forcing his DPP opponent Tsai Ing-wen to reveal her stance on the issue of cross-strait relations - long regarded a major weakness - while at the same time marginalizing People First Party chairman James Soong, whose potential candidacy could split the KMT's voter base. Others believe Ma simply made a mistake.
"While Ma wants to make China believe that he is serious about political negotiation in the future, he [wrongly] counts on that the mass public does not like Tsai Ing-wen so that it doesn't hurt to propose such kind of agreement," said Tsai Chia-hung, professor at the Election Study Center of Taipei's National Chengchi University.
Tsai acknowledged that many Taiwanese wouldn't class a peace agreement with China as an overly stupid idea, but in his eyes, Ma will fall victim to this apparent miscalculation.
"Certainly, Taiwanese show some support for the agreement, given that it seems harmless. But the DPP will mobilize people, and Ma may be underestimating the DPP."
To other experts, when Ma said his administration is cautiously considering whether Taiwan should sign a cross-strait peace agreement within the next decade, he basically said - nothing.
"Since Ma will not be president of the ROC a decade from now, he is not making any commitment at all," Steve Tsang, director of the University of Nottingham's China Policy Institute, pointed out.
Tsang says Ma was likely just reassuring Beijing of the goodwill from Taipei, and agrees that the 10-year timeline makes Ma's proposal somewhat meaningless.
"Let's not forget that 10 years from now the CCP leadership will be in another run up to another generational succession. That won't be the time when one can expect the CCP top leaders to take bold initiatives. Also, the assumption that China's development in the next decade will be on a linear project is generally unreliable."
Tsang then looked at what basis a peace agreement could possibly be on if it would come about nonetheless.
Despite the fears harbored by Taiwan's political opposition that Ma's KMT would eventually break its promise of making negotiations with China on the issue subject to sound legislative monitoring and a referendum, Tsang says a pact if seen as detrimental to Taiwan's situation is still unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate in Taiwan.
"It is hard to see any such agreement being politically acceptable in Taiwan if it should gravely undermine Taiwan's existing reality as an independent political entity or seriously put at risk Taiwan's capacity to defend itself," he said.
Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MJ27Ad01.html
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